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An increasingly popular “technological- 
discontinuity” paradigm, powerfully articulated 
in Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2011), argues that 
US workplaces have been, and will continue 
to be, automated and transformed by informa-
tion technology (IT) capital. Two implications 
of this transformation are emphasized. First, all 
sectors—but particularly IT-intensive sectors—
are experiencing major increases in productivity. 
Thus, Solow’s paradox is long since resolved: 
computers are now everywhere in our produc-
tivity statistics.1 Second, IT-powered machines 
will increasingly replace workers, ultimately 
1 Robert Solow’s comment on computers appears in his 
1987 New York Times Book Review article: “… what every-
one feels to have been a technological revolution, a drastic 
change in our productive lives, has been accompanied every-
where, including Japan, by a slowing-down of productiv-
ity growth, not by a step up. You can see the computer age 
everywhere but in the productivity statistics.” 
Return of the Solow Paradox? IT, Productivity, and 
Employment in US Manufacturing†
By Daron Acemoglu, David Autor, David Dorn, 
Gordon H. Hanson, and Brendan Price*
* Acemoglu: MIT, 40 Ames Street, Cambridge, MA 
02142, CIFAR, and NBER (e-mail: daron@mit.edu); 
Autor: MIT, 40 Ames Street, Cambridge, MA 02142, and 
NBER (e-mail: dautor@mit.edu); Dorn: CEMFI, Casado 
del Alisal 5, 28014 Madrid, Spain, and IZA (e-mail: dorn@
cemfi.es); Hanson: School of International Relations and 
Pacific Studies, 0519, University of California, San Diego, 
9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA 92093-0519, and NBER 
(e-mail: gohanson@ucsd.edu); Price: MIT, 40 Ames Street, 
Cambridge, MA 02142 (e-mail: bmprice@mit.edu). We 
thank Eli Berman, Susan Houseman, Stephen Machin, 
Kenneth Troske, and seminar participants at the AEA ses-
sion for valuable comments and assistance with data. 
Acemoglu and Autor acknowledge financial support from 
the Sloan Foundation (Grant 2011-10-12). Autor and Hanson 
acknowledge funding from the National Science Foundation 
(Grant SES-1227334). Dorn acknowledges funding from 
the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (ECO2010-
16726 and JCI2011-09709). Price acknowledges financial 
support from the Hewlett Foundation.
† Go to http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.5.394 to visit 
the article page for additional materials and author disclo-
sure statement(s).
leading to a substantially smaller role for labor 
in the workplace of the future.
Adding urgency to this argument, labor’s 
share of national income has fallen in numerous 
developed and developing countries over 
roughly the last three decades, a phenomenon 
that Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) 
attribute to IT-enabled declines in the relative 
prices of investment goods. And many scholars 
have pointed to the seeming “decoupling” 
between robust US productivity growth and 
sclerotic or negligible growth rates of median 
US worker compensation (Fleck, Glaser, 
and Sprague 2011) as evidence that the “race 
against the machine” has already been run—
and that workers have lost.
This paper provides a simple evaluation of 
this viewpoint using detailed data from the US 
manufacturing sector. We find, unexpectedly, 
that earlier “resolutions” of the Solow paradox 
may have neglected certain paradoxical features 
of IT-associated productivity increases, at 
least in US manufacturing. First, focusing on 
IT-using (rather than IT-producing) industries, 
the evidence for faster productivity growth 
in more IT-intensive industries is somewhat 
mixed and depends on the measure of IT 
intensity used. There is also little evidence 
of faster productivity growth in IT-intensive 
industries after the late 1990s. Second and more 
importantly, to the extent that there is more 
rapid growth of labor productivity (ln(Y/L)) in 
IT-intensive industries, this is associated with 
declining output (ln Y ) and even more rapidly 
declining employment (ln L). If IT is indeed 
increasing productivity and reducing costs, at 
the very least it should also increase output 
in IT-intensive industries. As this does not 
appear to be the case, the current resolution of 
the Solow paradox does not appear to be what 
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adherents of the technological-discontinuity 
view had in mind.
I. Information Technology and 
Labor Productivity
We employ the NBER-CES Manufacturing 
Industry Database, sourced from the Annual 
Survey of Manufacturers (Becker, Gray, and 
Marvakov 2013), to estimate and plot a set 
of simple, descriptive regressions that chart 
the relationship between IT investment and 
 industry-level outcomes for the time period 
1980–2009. Our regression model takes the 
form
(1)   log  Y jt = γ j +  δ t +  ∑ 
t=81
 
09
 β t × I T j +  e jt , 
where Y is an outcome variable (expressed in log 
points), γ is a vector of industry fixed effects, δ 
is a vector of time dummies, IT is a static mea-
sure of industry IT-intensity, and e is an error 
term. This specification normalizes the coeffi-
cient on the IT variable to zero in the base year, 
and hence the series  {  β 81 ,  β 82 , … ,  β 09 } may be 
read as the level of the coefficient on IT in each 
subsequent year relative to 1980. Following 
Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994) and 
Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998), we measure 
IT intensity as the ratio of industry computer (IT) expenditures to total capital expenditures.2
Figure 1, panel A, which plots the over-time 
relationship between IT-intensity and the log of 
real shipments per worker (our preferred pro-
ductivity measure),3 shows a dramatic differ-
ential rise in output per worker in IT-intensive 
industries throughout the entire 1980–2009 
period. But crucially, this pattern is almost 
entirely driven by the computer-producing 
 sector (North American Industry Classification 
2 Specifically, we compute this ratio in 1977, 1982, 1987, 
1992, 2002, and 2007 (no 1997 measure is available), take 
the average across these six data points (placing slightly 
greater weight on the last two periods to compensate for the 
absence of the 1997 measure), and standardize the result so 
that the final measure has zero mean and unit standard devia-
tion across employment-weighted industries. 
3 We choose this productivity construct because it is unaf-
fected by the choice of deflators for intermediate inputs: if 
the productivity of a dollar of IT investment rises over time 
due to IT quality improvements, this should raise shipments 
in IT-using industries. By contrast, the effect of rising IT 
quality on value-added and TFP in IT-using industries is 
ambiguous. Nevertheless, results using value added mea-
sures are very similar and are not shown to conserve space 
(see Figure A6 of the online Appendix). 
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Figure 1. IT Intensity and log Real Shipments per Worker, 1980–2009
Notes: Panel A: n = 387 manufacturing industries (n = 359 when excluding computer-producing industries). IT inten-
sity is defined as the ratio of computer investments to total investments, averaged over 1977–2007. Panel B: n = 120 
 non-computer-producing industries comprising SIC 34-38. The two computer investment series in panel B define IT inten-
sity as in panel A, using data from the indicated years. The technology usage series defines IT intensity as the employment-
weighted share of 17 advanced technologies used by plants within the industry. IT measures are normalized to have zero mean 
and unit standard deviation. Regressions are employment weighted and include industry and year fixed effects. Confidence 
intervals are based on standard errors clustered by industry.
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System (NAICS) 334).4 Across the entire manu-
facturing sector, industries that had a one stan-
dard deviation higher rate of IT investment over 
the sample period saw differential productiv-
ity gains averaging a remarkable 10 log points 
per decade between 1980 and 2009. Excluding 
computer-producing industries, however, results 
in a murkier picture. There is some differential 
productivity growth in IT-intensive industries in 
the late 1990s, but this effect is very small (on 
the order of a few percentage points at its peak) 
and subsides after 2001. By 2009, there is no net 
relative productivity gain in IT-intensive indus-
tries over the full sample period.
This productivity growth pattern is unex-
pected in light of the earlier resolution of the 
Solow Paradox (e.g., Oliner and Sichel 2000). 
One possible explanation is that our focus on 
manufacturing is misplaced—perhaps the pro-
ductivity gains from IT investments are taking 
place elsewhere. While our data do not allow 
us to exclude this possibility, earlier evidence 
from Stiroh (2002) suggests that the IT-driven 
productivity growth in the 1990s was not spe-
cific to non-manufacturing and may in fact 
have been more pronounced in manufacturing. 
Moreover, productivity growth in US manu-
facturing has generally exceeded that outside 
of manufacturing for many decades, and this 
productivity growth differential rose sharply 
during the 1990s (Fleck, Glaser, and Sprague 
2011).5
A second category of explanation for these 
unexpected results is that our measure of IT 
investment, constructed by averaging com-
puter investment data from 1977–2007, misses 
the mark. Plausibly, an IT investment mea-
sure that focused on the most recent years of 
IT investments—rather than averaging over 
4 Our focus on NAICS 334 follows Houseman, Bartik 
and Sturgeon (2013), who underscore that the relatively 
robust growth of productivity and value-added in US manu-
facturing over the last two decades is substantially driven 
by IT-producing industries. What Figure 1, panel A con-
tributes to this discussion is the finding that outside of the 
IT-producing industries, there is little relationship between 
IT investments and productivity growth. 
5 Table 2 of Stiroh (2002) shows somewhat slower dif-
ferential productivity growth of IT-intensive industries rela-
tive to 1987–1995 when durable goods manufacturing is 
excluded from the sample (compare columns 4 and 5 in the 
upper panel), though the pattern is reversed when the com-
parison is to 1977–1995 in the second panel. 
three decades—might prove more predictive 
of recent industry-level productivity growth 
since such a measure would better reflect the 
current locus of the IT frontier. We explore 
this possibility in Figure A1 of the online 
Appendix by plotting the over-time relationship 
between labor productivity and IT investment in 
 non-computer-producing industries using three 
different vintages of IT investment measures, 
corresponding to averages of 1977 and 1982, 
1987 and 1992, and 2002 and 2007 invest-
ments, as well as our preferred measure from 
panel A, which is simply the weighted average 
of all six years of investment data. This anal-
ysis does not lend support to the hypothesis 
that our primary IT measure is “out of date.” 
Indeed, the strongest predictor of industry rela-
tive productivity growth during the 1990s is 
the 1977/1982 investment measure, whereas 
the most recent measure (from 2002/2007) is 
the weakest predictor. Moreover, none of these 
measures predicts relative productivity growth 
in IT-intensive industries during the 2000s.
A further concern with our simple IT invest-
ment measure is that it may fail to capture recent 
innovations in IT that are embodied in newer 
manufacturing technologies, such as computer 
numerically controlled machinery, pick and 
place robots, automated guided vehicle sys-
tems, material working lasers, etc. To explore 
this possibility, we exploit data from the Census 
Bureau’s Survey of Manufacturing Technology (SMT) conducted in 1988 and 1993, and pre-
viously used by Doms, Dunne, and Troske (1997), which surveyed plants about their use 
of 17 advanced manufacturing technologies. 
Specifically, we reestimate equation (1) while 
replacing the computer investment measure 
with a SMT-based measure of the employment-
weighted mean fraction of the 17 technologies in 
use across plants in the 120 four-digit industries 
for which they are available (averaging over 1988 
and 1993). We exclude  computer-producing 
industries from this analysis (and all subsequent 
analyses), since our focus is on induced pro-
ductivity gains in IT-using industries. Figure 1, 
panel B, which plots these estimates, documents 
that labor productivity rose relatively rapidly in 
SMT-intensive manufacturing industries dur-
ing the 1980s and 1990s. As with the computer 
investment measure, however, the relationship 
between SMT technology adoption and indus-
try-level labor productivity plateaus in the late 
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1990s, and shows little further relative gain in 
labor productivity after 1999.
The SMT survey was only administered to 
plants in five major high-tech sectors (SICs 
34–38)—presumably those sectors where the 
17 manufacturing technologies  studied were 
most applicable.6 To check whether our main 
results for computer investment carry over 
to this restricted set of sectors, we reestimate 
our prior (Figure 1, panel A) model using 
only these five high-tech sectors (excluding 
 computer-producing industries), applying two 
vintages of the computer investment measure: 
our main measure using data from 1977–2007; 
and a measure that uses only investment data 
from 1987 and 1992, chosen to  parallel the 
SMT’s survey years of 1988 and 1993. These 
estimates, also plotted in Figure 1, panel B, indi-
cate that the computer investment measure is a 
weaker predictor of productivity growth in these 
five high-tech sectors than is the SMT-based 
measure. However, neither the SMT nor the 
computer investment measure predicts a differ-
ential rise in productivity in IT-intensive indus-
tries after the late 1990s.
In sum, our evidence so far suggests very 
limited IT-driven productivity growth in 
 computer-intensive manufacturing industries, 
with the contrasting result of more rapid pro-
ductivity growth in industries using advanced 
manufacturing technologies more intensively. 
Different measures of IT intensity thus appear 
to give different results. Our result based 
on advanced technologies may suggest that 
adoption of high-tech, IT-related capital has 
contributed to rapid productivity growth in man-
ufacturing, but our subsequent results cast doubt 
on this interpretation.
II. What Drives Rising Y/L: The Numerator 
or the Denominator?
Since our measure of labor productivity 
equals the log ratio of gross output to payroll 
employment, the positive relationship we detect 
in Figure 1 between industry IT and output per 
worker during the 1990s implies that indus-
try output is rising proportionately faster than 
6 These SICs are fabricated metal products,  non-electrical 
machinery, electrical and electronic equipment, transpor-
tation equipment, and instruments and related products 
industries. 
employment in IT-intensive industries. But it 
does not reveal whether either output is rising 
faster or employment is falling faster relative to 
non-IT-intensive industries.
We thus explore these two outcomes (output 
and employment) separately in the remaining 
figures. Under the assumption that IT-intensive 
industries are seeing improvements in technol-
ogy and automation and reductions in produc-
tion costs, we would expect them to experience 
a relative expansion in output. The implications 
for employment are of course ambiguous—and 
this could make the labor productivity measure 
somewhat more difficult to interpret—because 
these industries may be shedding labor as they 
automate, but may also increase employment as 
they expand.
Figure 2, panel A examines the numerator of 
this ratio, the logarithm of shipments, measured 
either as real or nominal shipments, using our 
1977–2007 measure of computer investments. 
The relationship between IT-intensity and indus-
try shipments is almost precisely the opposite of 
expectations: both real and nominal shipments 
rise at best modestly in IT-intensive industries (relative to non-IT-intensive industries) during 
the 1980s and then commence a relative decline 
in the 1990s that accelerates in the 2000s. Thus, 
relative output growth in IT-intensive industries 
begins to fall exactly when the IT-productivity 
payoff is thought to have materialized. While 
it could be that demand for the output of 
IT-intensive industries is price inelastic, this 
would not explain why real shipments decline. 
If, on the other hand, IT-intensive industries have 
upgraded their quality relative to other indus-
tries and this is not fully captured by the indus-
try price deflators, this mismeasurement could 
explain the decline in real shipments but not the 
decline in nominal shipments. The two sets of 
results together defy a simple explanation.
We repeat this exercise in Figure 2, panel B 
using the embodied IT capital measures from 
the SMT database. Though we detected above 
a more robustly positive relationship between 
use of advanced manufacturing technologies 
and growth in output per worker, Figure 2, panel 
B makes clear that this pattern is not driven by 
rising relative output in SMT-intensive indus-
tries. Instead, real (and nominal) shipments in 
industries that heavily adopted these technolo-
gies also exhibit a sharp relative decline between 
1992 and 1996, with no rebound thereafter.
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The combination of rising log output per 
worker and falling log output in IT-intensive 
industries implies that log employment must 
have fallen even more rapidly than output in 
these industries, a reality confirmed by Figure 3. 
Whether measured by total employment or 
by the real wage bill, labor input in technol-
ogy intensive industries declined sharply from 
the early 1990s through the early 2000s (in 
relative terms), and then roughly held steady 
during the 2000s. Thus, the flattening rela-
tionship between IT investments—measured 
either as computer investments (panel A) or 
usage of advanced manufacturing technolo-
gies (panel B)—and labor productivity in the 
2000s is proximately explained by the cessa-
tion of relative employment declines in these 
industries. Though one can read this evidence as 
corroborating the “ worker-less workplace” nar-
rative of recent technological change, the timing 
appears wrong: relative employment declines 
in  technology-intensive industries halted or 
modestly reversed from 2000 forward, which 
is inconsistent with the premise that IT has 
Figure 2. IT Intensity and log Real and Nominal Shipments, 1980–2009
Notes: Panel A: n = 359 non-computer-producing manufacturing industries, and IT intensity is based on 1977–2007 computer 
investments. Panel B: n = 120 non-computer-producing industries in SIC 34-38, and IT intensity is based on 1988/1993 tech-
nology usage. Real shipments are computed using industry-specific price deflators.
1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008C
oe
f. 
on
 IT
 m
ea
su
re
 × 
ye
ar
 d
um
m
y 15
10
5
0
–5
–10
–15
–20
–25
–30
–35
C
oe
f. 
on
 IT
 m
ea
su
re
 × 
ye
ar
 d
um
m
y 15
10
5
0
–5
–10
–15
–20
–25
–30
–35
Real shipments 95 percent ci
Nominal shipments 95 percent ci
Real shipments 95 percent ci
Nominal shipments 95 percent ci
Panel A Panel B
1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008C
oe
f. 
on
 IT
 m
ea
su
re
 × 
ye
ar
 d
um
m
y 15
10
5
0
–5
–10
–15
–20
–25
–30
–35
C
oe
f. 
on
 IT
 m
ea
su
re
 × 
ye
ar
 d
um
m
y 15
10
5
0
–5
–10
–15
–20
–25
–30
–35
Employment 95 percent ci
Real wage bill 95 percent ci
Employment 95 percent ci
Real wage bill 95 percent ci
Panel A Panel B
Figure 3. IT Intensity and log Employment and Real Wage Bill, 1980–2009
Notes: Panel A: n = 359 non-computer-producing manufacturing industries, and IT intensity is based on 1977–2007 computer 
investments. Panel B: n = 120 non-computer-producing industries in SIC 34-38, and IT intensity is based on 1988/1993 tech-
nology usage.
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 contributed to the slackening of labor demand in 
the new millennium.
III. Conclusion
This paper documents a pattern of growth 
among IT-using manufacturing industries that 
stands in contrast to the powerful and intui-
tively appealing view that IT is making work-
ers redundant through outsized productivity 
gains. While we find some evidence of dif-
ferential productivity growth in IT-intensive 
manufacturing industries, this depends on the 
measure of IT intensity and is never visible 
after the late 1990s. More importantly, when 
present, it is driven by declining relative out-
put accompanied by even more rapid declines 
in employment. It is difficult to square these 
output declines with the notion that computer-
ization and IT embodied in new equipment are 
driving a productivity revolution, at least in US 
manufacturing. It may well be that IT-induced 
technological changes are transforming non-
manufacturing, or that they are so widespread 
as to be taking place rapidly even in non-IT-
intensive industries. But at the very least, our 
evidence suggests that the  previously-proposed 
resolutions of the Solow Paradox need to be 
critically examined, and that proponents of the 
technological-discontinuity view need to pro-
vide more direct evidence of the IT-induced 
transformation in the US economy. Prior decla-
rations of the death of the Solow Paradox may 
have been premature.
REFERENCES
Autor, David H., Lawrence F. Katz, and Alan 
B. Krueger. 1998. “Computing Inequality: 
Have Computers Changed the Labor Mar-
ket?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 113 (4): 1169–1213. 
Becker, Randy, Wayne Gray, and Jordan Mar-
vakov. 2013. “NBER-CES  Manufacturing 
Industry Database.” National Bureau of 
Economic Research. http://www.nber.org/
nberces (accessed March 23, 2013).
Berman, Eli, John Bound, and Zvi Griliches. 
1994. “Changes in the Demand for Skilled 
Labor within U.S. Manufacturing: Evidence 
from the Annual Survey of Manufactures.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 (2): 
367–97. 
Brynjolfsson, Erik, and Andrew McAfee. 2011. 
Race Against the Machine. Lexington, MA: 
Digital Frontier Press.
Doms, Mark, Timothy Dunne, and Kenneth R. 
Troske. 1997. “Workers, Wages, and Tech-
nology.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 
112(1): 253–90.
Fleck, Susan, John Glaser, and Shawn Sprague. 
2011. “The Compensation-Productivity Gap: 
A Visual Essay.” Monthly Labor Review 134 (1): 57–69.
Houseman, Susan N., Timothy Bartik, and Timo-
thy Sturgeon. 2013. “Measuring Manufactur-
ing: Problems of Interpretation and Biases 
in the U.S. Statistics.” http://www.upjohn.
org/MEG/papers/Measuring%20Mfg_
Houseman_Bartik_Sturgeon.pdf (accessed 
February 27, 2014).
Karabarbounis, Loukas, and Brent Neiman. 
2014. “The Global Decline of the Labor 
Share.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 129 (1): 61–103.
Oliner, Stephen D., and Daniel E. Sichel. 2000. 
“The Resurgence of Growth in the Late 
1990s: Is Information Technology the 
Story?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 
14 (4): 3–22.
Solow, Robert M. 1987. “We’d Better Watch 
Out” review of Manufacturing Matters: The 
Myth of the Post-Industrial Economy, by 
Stephen S. Cohen and John Zysman, New 
York Times, July 12, 1987.
Stiroh, Kevin J. 2002. “Information Technology 
and the U.S. Productivity Revival: What Do 
the Industry Data Say?” American Economic 
Review 92 (5): 1559–76.
